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Nontechnical Summary
This study reconsiders the empirical relationship between taxation and foreign
direct investment (FDI), which is at the center stage in the debate on interna-
tional tax competition. To some extent this reflects the scarcity of available al-
ternative data on factor-mobility across international borders. But, the strong
increase in the volume of FDI flows over the last two decades makes FDI an
important phenomenon in its own right pointing to increased internationaliza-
tion of the economy. And, even though FDI cannot be equated with factor
mobility few economists will deny that taxation is a decisive determinant.
The empirical investigation focuses on the bilateral direct investments between
the European Union states. Using place to place data it takes explicitly account
of conditions in the source and in the destination country. To take account
of the variety of incentives provided by the tax systems, the empirical analy-
sis utilizes several measures of fiscal incentives including marginal effective tax
rates on international investment, statutory corporation tax rates, and median
company tax burdens from firm-level data. Besides tax incentives, the study
directly tests for effects of the supply of public services on FDI. Since, if pub-
lic service provision tends to improve locations’ attractiveness for investment,
tax competition might lead to an efficient outcome with company taxation
basically reflecting benefit taxation. Public spending figures as well as inter-
national rankings on locational conditions related to public sector activities
are employed to capture differences in the supply of public services. Finally, in
order to capture the economic distance between the considered countries the
study uses data on bilateral exports.
The empirical analysis of bilateral FDI flows confirms significant effects of
tax incentives on the location of FDI. In particular, lower cost of capital for
transnational investments relative to the cost of capital for domestic invest-
ments tend to raise FDI outflows. In addition, an increase in the difference
between the statutory tax rates in the home country and the statutory tax
rate of the destination country is related with an increase in FDI outflows.
The additional inclusion of the difference in the median tax burden between
home and destination country does not improve the predictive power of the
regression. Thus, the tax incentives are sufficiently captured by the marginal
tax burden and the statutory tax rates.
No strong evidence is found for a role of public expenditures in shaping loca-
tional attractiveness. Controlling for locational rankings and the expenditure
structure with regard to different functions of government an increase in public
consumption is associated with a significant decline of FDI outflows. However,
this finding is not robust and the effects found for the rankings as well as for
spending related with individual functions of government partly show rather
unexpected results.
Apart from the obvious difficulties to measure the provision of public services
the failure to detect a significant role of public expenditures can essentially be
interpreted in two directions. On the one hand, the weak indication of a role
of public spending could be taken as evidence that company taxation is not
characterized by an equivalence between tax burden and locational advantages.
Then, increased international competition for FDI would lead to future reduc-
tions of corporate taxation across European countries. On the other hand, the
absence of clear signs for public spending effects might simply be due to the
fact that locational advantages and disadvantages from differences in public
sector activities cannot be distinguished from other country characteristics as
they show only small variation across time. If this were the case, the results
could still be compatible with an equivalence of tax burdens and the supply
of public services in the long run. However, as only tax incentives do exert
observable effects on FDI increased competition for FDI might nevertheless
lead to reductions of company tax burdens. Since, if investors and politicians
alike were not able to identify the full consequences of a reduction of public
spending it would be difficult to prevent them from lowering tax rates despite
of a possible deterioration of locational conditions.
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Abstract:
In a place to place analysis of bilateral FDI flows the average company tax
burden, the statutory corporation tax rate, as well as the cost of capital are
used to capture the tax incentives. In addition, indicators of public spending
in general and with regard to different functions of government and rankings
of competitiveness related to public sector activities are used to measure the
role of public service provision. The results show significant effects of tax
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prove jointly significant. However, only weak indications of a countervailing
effect of public expenditures are found.
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1 Introduction
Although it originates from a heterogeneous set of transactions, only part of
which are related to actual location decisions, foreign direct investment (FDI)
is at the center stage in the debate on international tax competition. To some
extent this reflects the scarcity of available alternative data on factor-mobility
across international borders. But, the strong increase in the volume of FDI
flows over the last two decades make FDI an important phenomenon in its
own right pointing to increased internationalization of the economy. And,
even though FDI cannot be equated with factor mobility few economists will
deny that taxation is a decisive determinant of FDI.
The role of fiscal conditions as incentives for direct investment has been dis-
cussed intensively in particular for the US, which recorded a strong rise of
the inflow of direct investment since the late eighties. For example Scholes
and Wolfson (1992) argue that the strong rise of direct investment has to be
attributed to the fact that with the 1986 US tax reform the fiscal conditions
for foreign companies have improved strongly relative to domestic companies.
Initiated by the study of Hartman (1984) several empirical studies have tried
to prove the influence of taxes on direct investment (surveys are provided by
Hines, 1997, 1999, and de Mooij and Ederveen, 2001). While international dif-
ferences in company taxation have probably become of particular importance
within Europe in the course of significant integration steps in the nineties,
there are only few empirical studies which focus on the link between FDI and
taxes within Europe. In a study using firm-level data for US enterprises Dev-
ereux and Griffith (1998) establish the significance of the average tax burden
for the choice of location within Europe. Devereux and Freeman (1995) exam-
ine FDI flows between seven countries, including five European countries and
Gorter and Parikh (2000) provide an analysis using FDI stocks. Although the
tax burden is quite differently determined, both studies find significant effects
of differences in taxation while controlling for specific conditions in the target
and home countries.
In difference to the research on the effects of taxes of lower level governments
within federations (for a survey, see Bartik, 1991) the effect of public expendi-
tures is rarely discussed in the context of FDI (an exception being Hines, 1996,
and, Billington, 1999). This is somewhat surprising given that the workhorse
models of tax competition in the tradition of Tiebout explicitly deal with a
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positive impact of local public goods on the location of households and firms
(e.g., Wildasin, 1986, Zodrow and Mieskowski, 1986). Furthermore, empirical
studies for the US show that neglecting the provision of local public services
will lead to a downward bias in estimates of the effects of local taxing differen-
tials on the local economy (Bartik, 1991). This suggests to use controls for the
supply of public services in an empirical study. But, probably because of the
measurement problems involved, the literature on FDI follows an alternative
approach using pooled cross–sectional and time series data on FDI flows and
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity by means of dummy variables (De-
vereux and Freeman, 1995). However, in order to assess tax competition it
seems important to directly test for effects of the supply of public services on
FDI. If public service provision tends to improve locations’ attractiveness for
investment, tax competition might lead to an efficient outcome with company
taxation basically reflecting benefit taxation.
Given this background, this study reconsiders the empirical relationship be-
tween FDI and taxation in Europe. Explicitly taking account of conditions
in the source and in the destination country, it analyzes the determinants of
bilateral direct investments among the European Union states using place to
place data. Of course, it is well known that there exist significant problems
in the accounting procedure for FDI, and that even the statistics supplied by
supranational bodies like Eurostat and the OECD suffer from differences in
the national reporting procedures (Bellak, 1998). However, as emphasized by
Hines (1997) in order to study the determinants of FDI it is sufficient to focus
on the distribution of FDI flows among different countries. To take account
of the variety of incentives provided by the tax systems, the empirical anal-
ysis utilizes several measures of fiscal incentives including marginal effective
tax rates on international investment, statutory corporation tax rates, and
median company tax burdens from firm-level data. Public spending figures as
well as international rankings on locational conditions are employed to capture
differences in the supply of public services. Finally, in order to capture the
economic distance between the considered countries the study uses data on
bilateral exports.
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section develops the investigation
approach, before Section 3 provides a description of the data used. Section 4
reports the results. Finally, Section 5 provides the conclusions.
3
2 Investigation approach
To exploit the specific place to place feature of the bilateral flows data, the
analysis makes use of the technique of the so-called gravity models, originally
developed by Isard (1960,1998), which have proved quite successful in empirical
studies of direct investments and exports.
The basic idea is to assume a functional form, such that without any differ-
ences between two countries the expected value of the bilateral flow is given
by the size of the origin and the destination country as well as by the dis-
tance. Denoting the flow of direct investments from i to j with Ii,j a possible
specification is
Ii,j = δi,j · Yi · Yj ·
(
Ωj
Ωi
)
, (1)
where Yi and Yj denote the GDP of the countries and δi,j is an inverse indicator
of the distance. Ωi,Ωj capture the (expected) rate of return of an investment
at locations i and j, respectively, and in the current context are assumed to
be functions of the tax burdens and other locational characteristics at i and j.
Capturing the size of the countries in terms of their GDP might be regarded as
a reasonable approximation, but with regard to distance, it seems difficult to
come up with an operational indicator. As physical distance is a poor indicator
of the mutual openness of pairs of countries for trade and investment, we follow
an alternative approach which exploits the close relationship between FDI and
trade. This approach rests on the assumption that bilateral exports follow a
similar gravity model
Xi,j = δi,j · Yi · Yj.
By inserting this expression into equation (1) we can use the bilateral exports
as an indicator of the distance
Ii,j = Xi,j
(
Ωj
Ωi
)
. (2)
In this specification, FDI is proportional to exports and to the ratio of the
rates of return at the two jurisdictions. Although the proportionality between
bilateral exports and bilateral FDI is consistent with available empirical evi-
dence (Jost, 1997), estimation is based on a log linear version applied to the
4
direct investment observed as of period t
ii,j,t = β0 + β1xi,j,t + β2 (ωj,t − ωi,t) , (3)
where small letters denote logarithmically transformed variables.
To test for the impact of fiscal conditions the rate of return ωi is assumed to
be a log-linear function of the conditions at country i, such that
ii,j,t = a
H
i + a
D
j + a
T
t + b1xi,jt (4)
+ b2 (τi,t − τj,t) + b3 (gi,t − gj,t) + ²i,j,t,
where gi,t denotes the logarithm of public spending, τi,t is the logarithm of the
tax burden for investments in country i. aTt is a fixed time specific effect, which
controls for common shocks to all countries, like for instance the creation of
the Single Market or of EMU. The slope parameters b2, b3 capture the rela-
tionship between fiscal incentives and FDI. If b2 is positive, FDI outflows tend
to rise with higher taxation in the home country relative to the target country.
If public spending has a beneficial effect on the locational attractiveness, b3
should be negative.
The inclusion of country specific constants for origin countries (aHi ) removes
all common effects to the outflows from a particular country. This seems
important in order to control for unobserved locational characteristics of the
home countries and for differences in the reporting of FDI outflows. The
additional inclusion of country specific destination dummies (aDj ) controls for
unobserved characteristics in each of the destination countries. Alternatively,
the analysis could assume that each home and destination country pair has an
unobserved component and allow for a specific effect (Devereux and Freeman,
1995). Following standard panel data techniques one could simply condition
on the average distribution of FDI by using fixed effects. But, as this would
remove all time-invariant characteristics and, therefore, a considerable part of
the locational conditions, a random effects approach is preferred, provided no
indication is found that the individual effects are correlated with explanatory
variables.
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3 Data
The empirical investigation considers bilateral FDI flows within the European
Union in the period 1991 to 1998 obtained from Eurostat. The data follows
in principle the OECD benchmark definition for FDI. Even though Eurostat
harmonizes the data and eliminates some deviations of the national statistics,
figures for different countries remain not fully comparable due to differences
in the underlying national statistics. But even though the level of FDI might
be somewhat misleading, the current study aims at an explanation of the
distribution of FDI (Hines, 1997). As the coverage of available data is much
larger we focus on FDI financed with equity and other capital leaving aside
investments financed with reinvested earnings. Because some of the investment
flows are negative, estimation rests on an unbalanced panel made up by the
positive flows.
3.1 Measurement of tax incentives
Even for a single country the computation of effective tax rates is a formidable
task given the complexity and idiosyncrasy of each country’s tax system. The
required effort is raised considerably if one aims at getting a picture of the
cross-country distribution of tax burdens. And, even worse, for a promising
empirical analysis of the distribution of FDI flows over time we, moreover, need
measures over a longer time period. Facing these difficulties, the empirical
analysis below exploits a variety of different sources and methods.
In the tradition of the neoclassical investment literature foreign direct invest-
ment might be regarded simply as a physical investment decision where, con-
sequently, marginal effective tax rates are a sufficient statistic of the incentives
created by the tax system (Fullerton, 1984, and OECD, 1991). Of course,
in the context of transnational investments the concept of marginal effective
tax rates becomes much more involved as it is important to take account of
parent–subsidiary relationships.
As an indicator of the tax burden on investment the study employs domestic
and bilateral cost of capital provided by Devereux and Pearson (1995) and
in the corresponding report of the OECD (1991). These cost of capital take
account of the home country’s as well as of the target country’s tax system and
6
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on the cost of capital
Year Mean Std.-Dev Min Max
Transnational investment
1991 .071 .016 .048 .156
1999 .065 .007 .048 .084
Domestic investment
1991 .062 .005 .052 .070
1999 .064 .006 .049 .075
OECD (1991), Devereux et al. (2001), and own computations. Figures for domestic invest-
ment refer to 14 EU countries (Belgium and Luxembourg aggregated), figures for transnational
investment refer to investments in each of the other 13 EU countries.
explicitly consider their interaction for different sources of finance. However,
as the figures refer only to 1991, comparable figures for 1999 are taken from
Devereux et al. (2000: 36-38).1,2 For the intervening years 1992-1998 figures
are calculated by means of interpolation, assuming a gradual development
over time.3 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the user cost of capital
both for transnational as well as for domestic investment. The cost of capital
for transnational investment show a slight reduction which is consistent with
a reduction of the higher taxation of investment abroad. Moreover, as the
standard deviation is declining the cost of capital for transnational investment
tend to converge over time. Since the estimation equation (4) is focusing on
the relative tax burden of a investment at location j relative to an investment
at location i the empirical investigation uses the (log) ratio of the bilateral
cost of capital and the domestic cost of capital.4
1The figures are also reported in the EU-Commission staff paper COM(2001) 572 final: “Company Taxation
in the Internal Market”.
2Actually the method is not exactly equivalent, as the recent figures are based on separate calculations for
five different assets (Intangibles, Industrial Buildings, Machinery, Financial Assets, Inventories) whereas the
earlier report distinguishes only three different assets (Industrial Buildings, Machinery, Inventories) each of
which obtained a specific weight (28 %, 50 %, and 22 %, respectively). Note, that at least for the domestic
investment case Devereux et al. (2001: 24pp.) do not find strong effects of differences in composition and
weighting on the ranking of tax burdens.
3Calculations are based on the implied annual rate of change in the cost of capital separately for each type
of the three types of finance. The overall cost of capital used in the study is simply the average figure.
4Formally, instead of the tax differential (τi,t − τj,t) equation (4) employs (ci,j,t − ci,i,t) , where ci,j,t denotes
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Devereux and Griffith (1998, 1999) emphasized that foreign direct investment
might be related to locational decisions, where not just a marginal investment
but larger projects with earnings above the cost of capital are carried out (see
also Richter, Seitz, and Wiegard, 1996), and, therefore, the average tax burden
might be more important for the location of FDI. Consequently, they put
forward a measure of the effective average tax rate (EATR). Although Devereux
et al. (2001) provide those figures even for transnational investments, these
data refer to the cross-section in 1999 and thereby do not allow to assess the
development of the tax burden over time. However, EATR can be regarded as
a linear combination of the effective marginal tax burden and the statutory tax
rate where the weights are determined by the ratio of the cost of capital to the
overall rate of return (Schreiber et al., 2002). This points to jointly using both
marginal effective tax rates and statutory tax rates to capture the variation of
tax incentives. A role of the statutory tax is also indicated by survey data as
business executives consider the tax rate as being decisive for location decisions
(Sørensen, 1992). Moreover, in the context of multinationals the existence
of substantial intercompany transfers and financial flows opens possibilities
for reducing the overall tax burden of companies (Weichenrieder, 1996). As
a consequence, the statutory tax rate might be important for locations of
subsidiaries if companies are involved in activities of profit shifting (Sørensen,
2000).
Table 2 presents figures for the statutory tax rates in the European countries
since 1991.5 Despite a rather stable distribution of tax rates it documents
a significant reduction in the tax rates over time for countries like Germany,
Denmark, Greece, and Ireland resulting in a slight reduction of the average
tax rate and a slight reduction of the variation.
Even though the joint inclusion of statutory tax rates and marginal effective
tax burdens should capture a large part of the variation in tax incentives,
it is not obvious that taxation is in fact operated according to the stylized
consideration of the tax code. Therefore, it is tempting to compare the empir-
ical significance with an alternative measure of the tax burden based on the
actual tax payments of companies. Research often takes resort to national ac-
counts data relying on a mixture of tax revenue statistics and company surveys.
the logarithm of the user cost of capital for an investment in country j by an investor from country i.
5In the empirical analysis the figure for Belgium is replaced with a weighted average of Luxembourg and
Belgium.
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Table 2: Statutory rates of corporate taxation
Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Au 30.00 30.00 30.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00
Bee 39.00 39.00 40.17 40.17 40.17 40.17 40.17 40.17
Dk 38.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00
Fi 23.00 19.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 28.00 28.00 28.00
Fra,f 34.00 34.00 33.33 33.33 36.66 36.66 36.66 41.66
(42.00) (34.00) (33.33) (33.33) (33.33) (33.33) (33.33) (33.33)
Gea,c 53.75 53.75 53.75 48.38 48.38 48.38 48.38 47.48
(38.70) (38.70) (38.70) (32.25) (32.25) (32.25) (32.25) (31.65)
Gr 46.00 46.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00
Irb 43.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 38.00 38.00 36.00
It 36.00 36.00 36.00 36.00 36.00 37.00 37.00 37.00
Nl 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00
Lu 33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 32.00 20.00
Ptg 39.60 39.60 39.60 39.60 39.60 39.60 39.60 37.40
Spd 35.50 35.50 35.50 35.50 35.34 35.31 35.27 35.26
Sw 30.00 30.00 30.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00
Uk 33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 31.00
av. 36.59 35.86 35.56 35.33 35.54 35.67 35.61 34.66
std.dev. 7.31 7.75 6.45 5.43 5.41 4.96 5.00 6.42
Au: Austria, Be: Belgium, Dk: Denmark, Fi: Finland, Fr: France, Ge: Germany, Gr:
Greece, Ir: Ireland, It: Italy, Nl: Netherlands, Lu: Luxembourg, Pt: Portugal, Sp: Spain, Sw:
Sweden, Uk: United Kingdom.
a Different tax rates on retained earnings in parentheses.
b The manufacturing industry has a reduced rate of 10%.
c Since 1991 there is an additional surtax of 7.5% (since 1998 5.5%).
d Corporation tax inclusive of local surtax for chambers of trade and commerce (1.50% since
1995 gradually reduced to 0.75% in 1999 .
e Surtax of 3 % included since 1993.
f Surtax of 10 % since 1995, 25% (1998).
g Portugal has local surtaxes up to 10%.
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Table 3: Median of company tax burdens
Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Au 22.9 13.9 14.9 10.6 10.9 16.8 25.5 10.3
BL 15.7 17.7 22.7 22.3 23.9 23.4 22.0 20.6
Dk 30.1 30.2 30.8 30.9 32.3 31.0 30.2 31.8
Fi 39.3 32.6 22.0 25.3 27.0 27.8 27.9 28.1
Fr 32.4 32.5 32.1 32.4 34.8 33.9 37.1 36.1
Ge 48.4 47.9 42.4 39.5 39.4 39.8 38.9 39.0
Gr 9.1 26.0 29.1 26.9 30.7 33.8 35.0 33.0
It 41.4 47.0 50.7 44.4 45.8 45.3 44.1 43.9
Ir 16.4 13.6 13.6 14.3 14.4 16.8 20.2 23.5
Nl 32.1 32.5 31.4 31.1 30.6 31.7 30.1 31.0
Pt 19.9 32.0 24.4 19.8 24.0 19.0 19.0 18.9
Sp 27.9 28.8 26.8 24.6 24.1 26.4 26.0 27.7
Sw 30.0 27.8 16.1 27.6 27.4 26.9 28.3 27.7
Uk 31.7 31.4 30.7 31.4 31.1 30.1 29.7 28.9
av. 28.38 29.56 27.69 27.22 28.31 28.76 29.57 28.61
std.dev. 10.79 10.13 10.25 9.00 9.03 8.24 7.21 8.57
Median of company specific tax to profit ratios excluding multinational enterprises. BL: Belgo-
Luxembourg Economic Union. Source: Worldscope Global Database, CPB, own computations.
However, aside of other problems the data on tax revenues are in some cases
seriously flawed as a source for the international comparison of tax burdens
(e.g., Volkerink and de Haan, 2000). Therefore, the analysis follows a different
approach and employs a measure of the average tax burden based on a large
survey of company accounts in all European countries. In cooperation with the
CPB-Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis company accounts of
more than 6000 enterprises in all European countries provided by the World-
scope database were used to calculate firm specific tax burdens by relating the
tax payments to the profit before taxes, as reported in the company accounts.
From these tax burdens median figures for each country were taken to rep-
resent the tax burden. Since profits and taxes cannot be clearly assigned to
individual countries (Jacobs and Spengel, 2000) multinational companies were
removed from the dataset.6 Table 3 reports the corresponding figures. Note
that the figures do not show a common trend towards a reduction. In connec-
tion with the slight reduction of statutory tax rates as documented in Table
6Following the suggestions of Collins and Shackelford (1995) we tried to take account of cross country
differences in the tax codes related to depreciation rules, but faced intractable data limitations.
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2 this points to a trend towards widening of the tax base while lowering the
tax rates. Moreover, Table 3 indicates some convergence in the distribution of
median tax burdens. However, at the end of the last decade still considerable
variation exists.
To what extent the level of foreign taxes influences FDI depends crucially
on the existence and conditions of bilateral or multilateral tax agreements.
Within the European Union the so-called parent / subsidiary directive (guide-
line 90/435/EWG as of 23/07/1990) applies. In accordance with this directive
the profit of the subsidiary is subject to tax in the target country according
to the institutional regulations in the target country. In order to avoid double
taxation, two options are available to the home country of the parent company:
it may exempt income from foreign sources like for instance dividends received
from the subsidiary (tax exemption) or it may subtract the taxes paid abroad
from the tax bill on worldwide income (tax credit). While Greece, the United
Kingdom, Ireland, and Spain follow the tax credit method, the remaining EU
states follow the exemption method (Jacobs et al., 1999: 151). If the exemp-
tion method applies, the relevant tax burden for location decisions is defined
by the foreign taxes, while in case of tax credits the tax burden depends on
whether or not the tax burden is higher in the home country or in the target
country. Following Hines (1996) and Gorter and Parikh (2000) this institu-
tional fact is taken into account in the empirical analysis by means of specific
parameter restrictions. More specifically, in case of tax crediting the difference
in statutory corporation tax rates as well as in the median of the company
tax burdens is restricted to zero if the home country tax rate or tax burden is
higher.
3.2 Public services and other locational conditions
The empirical study takes account of various measures of the supply of pub-
lic services. As general indicators we use the levels of public consumption
and public investments as obtained from the statistics of the OECD. In addi-
tion, statistics on different functions of government are taken from a variety of
sources (see appendix). Expenditures on transport and communication are in-
cluded as they play a key role in determining a country’s public infrastructure.
Among presumably important locational conditions also education is consid-
ered as a determinant of the productivity of the workforce. But, whether or
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Table 4: Public spending (in % of GDP)
Country Public Public Educa- Transp. Internal
consumption investment tion & Commun. Security
Au 19.98 2.771 4.178 0.272 0.868
BL 21.31 1.760 4.627 0.538 1.317
Dk 25.91 1.788 5.684 0.646 0.951
Fi 23.52 3.074 5.895 1.125 1.236
Fr 23.76 3.323 4.982 0.534 0.886
Ge 19.61 2.404 3.690 0.508 1.561
Gr 14.54 3.293 2.477 0.354 0.863
Ir 16.02 2.347 3.022 0.573 1.665
It 17.69 2.519 4.582 0.466 1.776
Nl 23.84 2.560 4.545 1.307 1.241
Pt 17.89 3.851 5.325 0.573 1.817
Sp 18.04 3.690 3.546 0.389 1.733
Sw 27.30 2.766 5.257 0.803 1.482
Uk 19.75 1.871 4.456 0.475 2.056
Public consumption and investment: averages for 1991-1998. Source: OECD, own computa-
tions. Statistics on functions of government: averages for 1991-1998. BL, Uk, It, Pt until
1995, Sp, Ir until 1996, Fr until 1993, Nl and Sw exclusive of 1998. Source: Eurostat, UN,
and national statistics, own computations.
not public education expenditures will be favorable for a country’s attractive-
ness for investment depends among other factors on the degree of substitution
between public and private education. Of course, also the judicial system and
the enforcement of the law are important determinants of an attractive busi-
ness climate suggesting to include spending on internal security. However, the
inclusion of the spending on internal security might also pick up countries with
a high crime rate, if they undertake particularly large efforts within the area
of internal security.
Table 4 provides an overview on the variation of spending in these categories.
Due to significant differences in the underlying national statistics the figures
should be interpreted with some caution. However, there are no reasonable
alternatives available. Broadly the figures conform with common beliefs, as the
Scandinavian countries show comparatively large levels of spending, whereas
Greece and Ireland show lower figures. The table does not reveal the fact that
for most of the considered countries the level of spending and its composition
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Table 5: Competitiveness rankings
Country Science & Government Infra-
Technology structure
Au 17.00 25.75 12.38
BL 13.50 41.00 18.25
Dk 12.63 19.63 8.25
Fi 8.38 24.13 4.75
Fr 5.38 37.38 15.25
Ge 3.13 19.25 8.75
Gr 38.38 40.00 38.75
Ir 15.13 18.88 22.88
It 28.88 44.38 27.38
Nl 9.63 25.63 12.63
Pt 40.88 27.00 33.63
Sp 30.75 28.75 24.13
Sw 8.50 34.75 3.25
Uk 13.38 14.75 14.63
Average ranking 1991 to 1998 among 47 countries. Source: International Institute for Man-
agement Development: World Competitivness Yearbook, own computations.
into separate functions of governments is rather stable over time. A minor
exception is Transport and Communication where in the nineties spending fell
somewhat behind the other functions of government.
To capture the quality of public services, the empirical study takes account of
indices of “competitiveness” as provided by the International Institute for Man-
agement Development (IMD) for 47 countries. Among other indicators IMD
publishes rankings of individual countries to capture differences in the scien-
tific and technological environment, in the efficiency and business orientation
of the government, and in the general infrastructure. Although the indicators
are rather broadly defined, they capture a variety of locational characteristics
which are related to public sector activities. The government indicator for
economic and fiscal policies takes account of national indebtedness, the struc-
ture and efficiency of the public administration as well as the status of internal
security. For the evaluation of the scientific and technological environment the
IMD ranking considers spending and employment within the area of research
and development, the technology management as well as measures of intel-
lectual property. The ranking of the infrastructure aims at summarizing the
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assessment of natural and technical conditions as well as the transport and
communication infrastructure.
Despite of the possible importance of taxation and public services, they cer-
tainly do not give a comprehensive picture of the determinants of the distribu-
tion of FDI flows. According to Dunning (1994) strategic motives related to
regional markets account for almost half of the FDI transactions world-wide.
The international competition as well as the increasing specialization would
force many enterprises to intensify marketing activities and extend their sales
networks. This points to a close link between exports and FDI which has
been confirmed in empirical studies. For example, Jost (1997) shows that the
regional structure of German FDI abroad is almost proportional to the distri-
bution of its exports (see also Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report, May
1997: 63pp). Therefore, the empirical analysis employs the bilateral exports
between the respective home and target country as obtained from the OECD.
As was pointed out in Section 2 a heuristic interpretation of this variable is
provided by the gravity approach.
Finally, one might consider to take account of further cost differences between
locations by adding measures of the real exchange rate to the set of regressors
(e.g., Jost, 1997). However, as available data on price indices and exchange
rates can be combined only in indices of the change of the cost competitiveness,
a thorough analysis requires a dynamic model. Moreover, available evidence
indicates that the contemporaneous correlation between indices of cost com-
petitiveness and exports is a poor indicator of the long-run effects (Carlin et
al., 2001). As the time series dimension of the data in the current study is
rather short a treatment of the role of cost competitiveness is left for future
research.
4 Results
Column (1) in Table 6 shows the results of a basic regression of FDI outflows
on the marginal effective tax burden. This is captured by the cost of capital
for a transnational investment of an investor situated in the home country
and investing in the considered target country relative to the cost of capital
for a domestic investment. Moreover, government consumption as well as the
bilateral exports are included as explanatory variables. Note that the flow
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Table 6: Basic regression results
dep. variable: logarithm of outward FDI per GDP
method OLS OLS OLS OLS IV FE RE
specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
tax rate 0.626 ? 0.565 0.568 ? -0.190 0.981 ??
(1.74) (1.61) (1.66) (0.37) (4.61)
ucc -1.322 ?? -1.300 ?? -1.231 ?? -0.906 -1.382 ??
(2.50) (2.34) (2.41) (1.41) (2.94)
tax burden 0.129
(0.67)
bil. exp. 1.114 ?? 1.124 ?? 1.125 ?? 1.114 ?? 1.152 ?? 0.765 ?? 1.209 ??
(15.4) (16.1) (16.3) (15.2) (16.6) (2.34) (17.2)
pub. cons. 1.009 1.282 1.104 1.198 1.140 0.934 1.260 ??
(1.02) (1.28) (1.05) (1.20) (1.18) (1.06) (3.69)
nobs 898 898 898 898 898 898 898
R2 0.662 0.661 0.663 0.659 0.663 0.779 0.523
R2 adj. 0.648 0.647 0.650 0.645 0.649 0.732 0.517
Hausman 0.086 ? 0.181
All variables are logarithmically transformed, bilateral export is measured relative to GDP,
public consumption refers to the log. difference of spending per GDP between home and target
country. See text for further description. Regressions include time-specific fixed effects. (1)-(5)
also employ dummy variables for each home and target country. (6) and (7) display results
from fixed effects and random effects regressions, respectively. The bottom line reports the
probability value of Hausman statistics. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. ? , ??,
indicate significance at levels of 10% and 5%.
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variables, FDI, exports, and public spending, are scaled using the current
home country GDP.7
As the FDI data report the actual investments taken in the target country we
expect an inverse effect of the cost of capital on FDI. The results are support-
ive, indicating that the relative tax burden on international direct investment
in fact suppresses investment. With an average user cost of capital in the
sample around 0.065 the implied tax elasticity is at -0.397.8 As compared to
the literature this effect is not particularly strong.9 Bilateral exports show a
strong positive effect which is somewhat larger than proportional albeit not
significantly so (standard error equals .072). The coefficient of the government
consumption points to a positive, although not significant, influence.
In presence of signaling effects, profit shifting, or just because tax incentives
for marginal investments are not sufficient to capture the variation in the fis-
cal incentives, we should observe an additional impact of the difference in the
statutory tax rate (taking account of tax credits, if applicable). Specifica-
tion (3) however shows no significant positive effect of the difference in the
statutory tax rate if jointly entered with the cost of capital variable (compare
specification 2). However, as compared to specification (1) the adjusted R2
still indicates the joint significance of the marginal effective tax burden and
the statutory tax rate. This joint significance can be seen as a confirmation
that the average effective tax rate is decisive for the location of FDI within
Europe as found by Devereux and Griffith (1998).
For comparison, specification (4) reports results obtained from the alternative
use of the median company tax burden. If only home country dummies are
included, there is, in fact, a strong positive effect (results not shown). However,
if the estimation takes account of specific conditions in the target country by
means of a country specific dummy, the effect of the tax burden becomes
insignificant as displayed in (4). The same result (not shown) is obtained if
the median tax burden is entered jointly with the user cost and the statutory
7In terms of equation (4) i,x, and g are replaced with i˜i,j,t = log
Ii,j,t
Yi,t
, x˜i,j,t = log
Xi,j,t
Yi,t
, and g˜i,t = log
Gi,t
Yi,t
.
8Table 6 reports the elasticity with respect to the user cost. To obtain the implied tax elasticity the
coefficient is multiplied with t/(1− t), where t is the implied tax rate t = (c− r) /c, r is the rate of return
fixed at 0.05, and c is the average user cost of capital in the sample. Hence, the tax elasticity can be obtained
approximately by multiplying the estimated coefficient of the user cost with 0.3.
9In his survey on the US literature Hines (1997) finds a consensus estimate of -0.5. In their recent review
Mooij and Ederveen (2001) find a representative figure of -3.3 for the semi-elasticity capturing the response to
a 1 % increase in the tax rate. In the current analysis the semi-elasticity can be approximated by multiplying
the coefficient estimate with 1.3. The corresponding figure obtained for specification (1) is -1.719.
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tax rate. Hence, the tax incentives are sufficiently captured by the marginal
tax burden and the statutory tax rates.
Specifications (1) to (4) condition on the volume of bilateral exports, thereby
neglecting a possible simultaneity between exports and investment. To test for
the significance of a simultaneity bias specification (5) follows an instrumental
variable approach, employing the bilateral exports as of period 1991 as an
instrument for all subsequent years. This instrumental variable strategy would
yield consistent estimates even if exports react to shocks in FDI provided the
temporal variation of bilateral exports is not correlated with the unobserved
component of the FDI flow. Unfortunately, as there are no overidentifying
restrictions the latter assumption cannot be tested empirically. The results
for the IV regression are almost the same as in (3) and a Hausman test of
(5) vs. (3) indicates only weak significance. Thus, given the choice of the
instrument, there seems to be no strong simultaneity bias present.
Whereas specifications (1) to (5) control for country specific effects, each bilat-
eral flow might be affected in a different way by unobserved characteristics of
target and home country. As Devereux and Freeman (1995) suggest, this could
be taken into account by means of a panel data analysis. Specification (6) re-
ports results from a standard within estimator, which differs from the basic
results in particular by showing much larger standard errors. As this could be
the consequence of insufficient variation across time in the variables, it seems
more promising to apply a random effects estimator. This seems appropriate
in particular, since the Hausman statistic of fixed vs. random effects does not
allow to reject the random effects approach. The results as displayed in (7)
generally support the findings from the basic regression, with the statutory tax
rate being highly significant. The tax elasticity implied by the coefficient of
the user cost of capital is about the same as in specification (1) (approximately
-0.415). Interestingly, the elasticity with respect to the statutory corporation
tax which can be directly read off the table is about twice as large.10 How-
ever, public consumption shows a significant positive effect, whereas a negative
sign should be expected if public spending has effects on productivity. At this
point one could only speculate about possible explanations. It could be that a
higher level of spending implies an additional tax burden falling onto investors
in the home country rather than an improvement of productivity. However,
an alternative explanation could simply be that public consumption is a weak
10With an average statutory corporation tax of 0.356 the semi-elasticity is at -2.756.
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indicator of the productivity effects of public sector activities.
As evident from Table 7 a consideration of public sector investments does not
show any additional effects. Specification (1) employing country dummies and
specification (2) relying on random effects both find no significant effect of
public investment. Of course, the current spending could be weakly related to
the actual provision of public infrastructure.
Alternatively, specification (3) relies on the relative ranking indices of the IMD.
Two of the rankings show significant effects, namely those related to science
and technology as well as to the infrastructure. However, in both cases the
coefficient is negative, indicating that home countries with a high ranking of
technology and infrastructure relative to the target countries actually show
larger FDI outflows. As can be seen from specification (5) the result obtained
for science and technology is robust against the inclusion of the expenditure
structure, in terms of spending on education, transport and communication,
and internal security, which are all insignificant even when entered without the
rankings (compare specification 4). Note that since the public spending figures
are available only for a subset of observations, specifications (4) and (5) use
only 509 observations. This is also the case with specification (6), providing
results for a random effects specification, which is preferred provided the un-
observed effects are not correlated with the explanatory variables. Again, this
assumption cannot be rejected on grounds of a Hausman test. Specification
(6) is supportive of the joint significance of statutory tax rates and the user
cost of capital. Moreover, it seems broadly consistent with a proportionality
between bilateral FDI and bilateral exports. With regard to overall public
consumption we now find a significant negative impact. As the regression
controls for the public expenditure structure and for the ranking of locational
conditions, this result indicates that higher overall spending raises locational
attractiveness holding constant the quality of public services provided. The
inclusion of country rankings as well as the public expenditure composition
among the controls yields a larger coefficient for the tax incentive as captured
by the cost of capital. This is consistent with the presumption of Bartik (1991)
that when omitting locational characteristics analyses would tend to underes-
timate the role of tax incentives. For specification (6) the implied elasticity
from the coefficient of the user cost now is obtained at -0.452. For the current
sample this implies that an increase in the tax rate by 1 percentage point re-
duces the inflow (raises the outflow) of FDI by about 1.959 %. However, with
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Table 7: Further regression results
dep. variable: logarithm of outward FDI per GDP
method OLS RE OLS OLS OLS RE
specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
tax rate 0.546 0.972 0.496 0.384 0.161 0.592 ??
(1.56) (4.56) (1.46) (1.03) (0.43) (2.67)
ucc -1.209 ?? -1.399 ?? -1.205 ?? -0.811 ?? -1.190 ?? -1.507 ??
(2.31) (2.98) (2.38) (1.23) (1.99) (2.55)
bil. exp. 1.124 ?? 1.206 ?? 1.055 ?? 1.062 ?? 1.013 ?? 1.172 ??
(16.2) (17.1) (14.7) (12.8) (11.3) (15.4)
pub. cons. 1.870 1.388 ?? 0.839 -2.542 -1.548 -1.660 ??
(1.63) (3.78) (0.77) (1.23) (0.73) (2.37)
public inv. -0.417 -0.152
(1.53) (0.96)
sci.& techn.-rnk. -0.096 ?? -0.180 ?? -0.209 ??
(2.26) (3.31) (4.07)
governmt.-rnk. 0.094 -0.096 0.009
(1.47) (0.67) (0.08)
infrastr.-rnk. -0.146 ?? -0.173 -0.148 ?
(2.78) (1.55) (1.95)
education -0.766 0.708 0.570
(0.85) (0.74) (1.46)
transp. comm. -0.204 -0.028 0.332 ?
(0.40) (0.06) (1.91)
internal sec. 0.449 -0.225 -0.738 ??
(0.98) (0.46) (3.31)
nobs 898 898 898 509 509 509
R2 0.664 0.521 0.670 0.664 0.680 0.595
R2 adj. 0.650 0.515 0.656 0.639 0.655 0.582
Hausman 0.125 0.153
Variables except of rankings are logarithmically transformed, bilateral export is measured rela-
tive to GDP, public spending variables refer to the log. difference of spending per GDP between
home and target country. See text for further description. Regressions include time-specific
fixed effects. (1),(3), (4), and (5) include dummy-variables for each home and target country.
(2) and (6) display results from random effects regressions. The bottom line reports the proba-
bility value of Hausman statistics. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. ? , ??, indicate
significance at levels of 10% and 5%.
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regard to the statutory tax rate the results suggest a smaller elasticity than
without variables capturing the ranking and the structure of public spending
(compare specifications (2) of Table 7 and (7) of Table 6). Moreover, a part
of the effects assigned to public sector activities object a straightforward in-
terpretation in terms of reactions of investment to locational advantages and
disadvantages as the coefficients for the ratio of the rankings as well as for
spending on transport and communication seem to indicate that less public
spending and less favorable conditions in the target country would raise rather
than reduce investment.
5 Conclusions
The empirical analysis of bilateral FDI flows has confirmed significant effects
of tax incentives on the location of FDI. In particular, lower cost of capital for
transnational investments relative to the cost of capital for domestic invest-
ments tend to raise FDI outflows. In addition, an increase in the difference
between the statutory tax rates in the home country and the statutory tax
rate of the destination country is related with an increase in FDI outflows.
The difference in the median tax burden between home and destination coun-
try proves significant only if the overall attractiveness of destination countries
is not controlled for by means of country specific constants. Moreover, the
additional inclusion of the median tax burden does not improve the predictive
power of the regression. Hence, the tax incentives are sufficiently captured by
the marginal tax burden and the statutory tax rates.
No strong evidence is found for a role of public expenditures in shaping loca-
tional attractiveness. Controlling for locational rankings and the expenditure
structure with regard to different functions of government and increase in
public consumption is associated with a significant decline of FDI outflows.
However, the rankings as well as spending related with individual functions
of government partly show unexpected results. Thus, the empirical analysis
provides only weak support for a countervailing impact of public spending on
locational conditions.
Apart from the obvious difficulties to measure the provision of public services
this can essentially be interpreted in two directions. On the one hand, the
weak indication of a role of public spending could be taken as evidence that
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company taxation is not characterized by an equivalence between tax bur-
den and locational advantages. Then, increased international tax competition
would lead to future reductions of corporate taxation across European coun-
tries. On the other hand, the absence of clear signs for public spending effects
might simply be due to the fact that locational advantages and disadvantages
from differences in public sector activities cannot be distinguished from other
country characteristics as they show only small variation across time. If this
were the case, the results could still be compatible with an equivalence of tax
burdens and the supply of public services in the long run. However, as only tax
incentives do exert observable effects on FDI increased tax competition might
nevertheless lead to reductions of company tax burdens. Since, if investors and
politicians alike were not able to identify the full consequences of a reduction
of public spending it would be difficult to prevent them from lowering tax rates
despite of a possible deterioration of locational conditions.
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Datasources and definitions
FDI: bilateral flows of direct investment, 1991-1998, financed with equity
and capital of 12 EU-countries into 14 EU-partner countries (ouflows
for Greece and Ireland were not available) in ECU, Belgium and Luxem-
bourg are aggregated to the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union. Source:
Eurostat, European Union Direct Investment.
Data on taxation: see section 3.1.
Bilateral exports (f.o.b.). Source: OECD, Monthly Statistics of Foreign
Trade. Annual figures, transformed in ECU using the average annual
US $ - ECU exchange rate. Source: Eurostat, Basic Indicators.
Public consumption as a share of GDP. Annual figures. Source: OECD,
Fiscal Positions and Business Cycles (appropriation accounts).
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Public investment expenditures as a share of GDP. Annual figures. Source:
OECD, Fiscal Positions and Business Cycles (appropriation accounts).
Public expenditures for functions of government: as a share of GDP,
annual figures. The data are basically taken from Eurostat following the
COFOG Classification of the UN. Missing data are complemented with
data from the UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics for Austria,
Greece, and Sweden as well as with data from national statistics in the
case of Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, and Sweden.
Where necessary, spending data were transformed into ECU using annual
average exchange rates. Source: Eurostat, Basic Indicators.
GDP in ECU. Source: Eurostat, Economy and Finance.
Rankings of Competitiveness: Annual rankings of science & technology,
government efficiency, and infrastructure among a group of 47 countries.
Source: World Competitiveness Yearbook issued by the International
Institute for Management Development (IMD), various issues.
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